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NOTES
RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION TRANSFERS:. ADEQUACY
OF-SUPERVISION UNDER THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Over five hundred radio and television stations were transferred in
a recent twelve month period reflecting the increasing significance of
transfers in regulation of the industry.1 While the history of radio regu-
lation traces back to 1910,2 the first legislation controlling transfers was
the Radio Act of 1927 which required "the consent in writing of the
licensing authority."3 The Communications Act of 1934 re-enacted this
provision and added the "public interest" criterion as a basis for judging
transfers.4  Under this vague statutory mandate,, the FCC has empha-
sized a number of factors in approving or disapproving transfer applica-
1. For purposes of this Note, "transfer" will refer to transfer and assignment of
stations (which naturally includes the license), and transfers of construction permits.
From September 1, 1953 to August 30, 1954, approximately 515 radio and television sta-
tions were transferred or assigned. Broadcasting-Telecasting, September 7, 1953 to
August 30, 1954. This represents a fivefold increase over the number of transfers which
occurred in 1939. 86 CONG. REc. 434-437 (1940).
In the early forties Herbert M. Bingham, member of the Federal Communications
Bar Ass'n, had this to say: "[due to economic growth and development of the industry,
to the large investments made in individual stations, and to the value of such stations when
established and placed in operation, it is no longer possible to deal with this subject
[transfers] casually or as an incident to other subjects. The transfer section should be
dealt with as one of the major licensing provisions of the act, of equal or greater in
importance than other licensing provisions." Hearings before the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1942).
2. The Ship Act of 1910, 36 STAT. 629 (1910), was the first attempt to regulate
radio. It required passenger ships to be equipped with radio apparatus. The Act of
1912, 37 STAT. 302 (1912), was enacted principally to foster radio-telegraphy, and vested
in the Secretary of Commerce power to grant licenses. The Radio Act of 1927, 44
STAT. 1162 (1927), created the Federal Radio Commission. This commission had more
regulatory powers than did the Secretary of Commerce under former legislation. The
act was held constitutional in City of New York v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 F.2d
115 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 729 (1930). The Communications Act of
1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1934), shifted complete authority to regulate
radio to the Federal Communications Commission.
For discussion of the early history and development of radio regulation, see SocoLow,
THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING § 25-54 (1st ed. 1939) ; EDLEMAN, LICENSING OF RADIO
SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927 To 1947 1-11 (1950) ; O'Leson, History of Radio
Regidation, in RADIO ANNUAL 627-638 (1942).
3. 44 STAT. 1167 (1927).
4. 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (b) (1934). While this'provision represents the
first application of "public interest" to transfer regulation, it was originally applied in
regard to licenses in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1166 (1927).
This phrase "public interest, convenience or necessity" was adopted from public
utility regulation. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity
as Used in the Radio Act of z927, 1 Am L. REv. 295, 303-313 (1930) ; see Segal and
Warner, "Ownership" of Broadcasthg "Frequencies": A Review, 19 RocxY MT. L. REv.
111, 115 (1947).
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tions.' Primary attention was given the relation of sale price to the
value of the station,6 qualifications of the transferee,' benefits to the
public from transfers,' and prevention of trafficking in licenses.9
In a series of proposals to amend the Communications Act beginning
in 1942, it was advocated that the FCC be limited to a consideration of
a transferees' qualifications." These proposals aroused objections from
the FCC which maintained that such limited inquiry would permit traf-
ficking and auctioning of licenses and would eliminate controls over mar-
ginal licensees." When the Act was amended in 1952, the "public in-
5. One important test is the qualifications of the transferor prior to the transfer. If
the transferor has been found unqualified, the transfer application is denied. WOKO,
10 FCC 454 (1945) ; cf. D.R. James, Jr. 9 Pike & Fischer RR 917 (1953). Consistent
with this principle is the Commission's refusal to approve a transfer unless the trans-
feror's license is renewed. Julio Conesa, 11 FCC 200 (1946) ; accord, KFNF, Inc., 11
FCC 78 (1945).
6. The significance of the sale price for the station as a factor in transfers is dis-
cussed in a great many cases. See Edward J. Nobel, 11 FCC 569, 571-574 (1946);
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 6 FCC 605, 606-611 (1938); Pacific Radio Corp., 5 FCC 427,
427-428 (1938); Exchange Avenue Baptist Church, 5 FCC 333, 336-337 (1938); Lan-
caster Broadcasting Service, Inc., 2 FCC 164, 166-167 (1935).
7. See Radio Coarp. of America, 10 FCC 212, 213 (1943) ; Lee E. Mudgett, 8 FCC
227, 228 (1940) ; Anchorage Radio Club, Inc., 7 FCC 306, 313 (1939) ; P. W. Hoffman,
6 FCC 498, 501 (1938) ; Exchange Avenue Baptist Church, 5 FCC 333, 341 (1938) ; First
Congregational Church of Berkeley, 3 FCC 417, 421 (1936).
8. See Evening News Publishing Co., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 1096, 1097 (1953);
Sunland Broadcasting Co., 6 Pike & Fischer RR 1053, 1076 (1950) ; Edward H. Butler,
9 FCC 141, 142 (1942) ; Sapp and Sapp, 6 FCC 521, 523 (1938) ; Smith and Mace et al.,
5 FCC 342 344 (1938) ; Reynolds, Hughes, and Allen, 4 FCC 382, 384 (1937) ; contra:
Walton Broadcasting Co., 10 Pike & Fischer 10 (1953) ; Lancaster Broadcasting Service,
Inc., 2 FCC 164 (1935) ; Red Oak Radio Corp., 1 FCC 163 (1934).
9. See City of Sebring, Fla., 11 FCC 873, 890 (1947) ; KFNF, Inc., 11 FCC 78, 88-
89 (1945) ; Hearst Radio, Inc., 7 FCC 292, 295 (1939) ; Tornek, 4 FCC 193, 196 (1937).
10. The Sanders Bill (H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.) was the first in a series of
proposed amendments. This bill seemed to limit the "public interest" test to the trans-
feree's ability to construct and operate a station, rather than applying it to the entire
transfer proceeding. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942). The White-Wheeler Bill was similar but
would have specifically required that the transferee's qualifications equal those of an
original licensee. Hearings before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1943). Subsequent proposals were even more
restrictive, specifying that a transferee's qualifications equal those of an original licensee
and completely abolishing the "public interest" criterion. See Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on S.i333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1947) ; Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.1973, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949) ; Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S.658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951). Each of these last two bills passed
the Senate.
11. In discussing the proposed substitution of the transferee's qualifications for the
"public interest" criterion, Wayne Coy, Chairman of the FCC stated: "There are, as
we see it, two basic dangers in the proposed change. In the first place by limiting the
Commission's considerations of a proposed transfer solely to the qualifications of the
proposed transferee, the Commission would be deprived of any control over trafficking
in radio licenses. This is a serious problem in and of itself. But also, it would permit
a person to secure a valuable broadcast license and then auction it off to the highest
NOTES
terest" test was retained, 2 with the added provision that transfer appli-
cations should be "disposed of as if the proposed transferee or assignee
were making application under § 308 [licensing provision] for the permit
or license in question."" This reference to the licensing section requires
the FCC to determine whether the proposed transferee possesses the
qualifications of an original licensee." Since the commission has in the
past considered the qualifications of a transferee under the "public in-
terest" test,'" it may be questioned why the statutory requirement was
added. It might be contended that the only possible significance of the
inclusion of this criterion is that it was intended to be the sole considera-
tion in judging transfers. 6 Such an interpretation is unjustified. Be-
fore a transfer can be approved the statute requires a finding that the
"public interest, convenience and necessity will be served thereby."' The
bidder. . . ." Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
S. 658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1951). Similar statements were made by Charles R.
Denny while he was Chairman of the FCC. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.i333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1947).
12. 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b) (1952) provides in part that no license or construction permit should be granted
except: ". . . upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served thereby." This language was added by the House after the bill
had been passed by the Senate. 96 CONG. REc. 7506 (1952).
13. 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b) (1952).
14. "It should be emphasized that the Commission's authority . . . to determine
whether the proposed transferee possess the qualifications of an original licensee or
permittee . . . is expressly stated." SEN. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951).
15. SEN. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951) discussing the transfer provision
states: ". . . the Commission's authority . . . to determine whether the proposed
transferee possesses the qualifications of an original licensee or permittee is not impaired
or affected in any degree." t
A comparison of the cases indicates that qualifications required of licensees and
transferees have been basically the same. Factors considered by the Commission in non-
competitive license and transfer proceedings include: financial qualifications, Radio
Enterprises, Inc., 7 FCC 169, 174 (1939) (licensing), George F. Courrier, 9 FCC 139,
140 (1942) (transferring) ; legal qualifications, Sam Klaver, 6 FCC 536, 537-538 (1938)
(licensing) ; KVOS, Inc., 6 FCC 22, 26 (1938) (transferring) ; technical qualifications,
Frank Wilburn, 1 FCC 146, 147-148 (1934) (licensing); Exchange Avenue Baptist
Church, 5 FCC 333, 337 (1938) (transferring) ; factors reflecting the character of the
applicant, Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 160 F.2d 285, 287-288 (D.C. Cir. 1947)
(licensing); Mester v. FCC, 70 F.Supp. 118, 122-123, aff'd per curiam, 332 U.S. 749
(1947), rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 820 (1947) (transferring) ; miscellaneous factors
considered such as quality of program service, John C. Hughes, 5 FCC 120, 122 (1938)
(licensing) ; Smith and Mace, 5 FCC 342, 344 (1938) (transferring).
For discussions of licensing requirements, see EDELMAN, THE LICEN SING OF RADIO
SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927 To 1947, 59-90 (1951) ; Note, 25 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
245 (1951).
16. See Wall and Jacob, Communications Act Amendments, 1952-Clarity or An-
biguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135, 153 (1953). The writers raise the possibility of this interpreta-
tion. This construction requires the limitation of the "public interest" test to a considera-
tion of only the transferee's qualifications.
17. 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b) (1952). See Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Neces-
sity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 Am L. REv. 295, 303-313 (1930).
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only stated restriction on the FCC's evaluation of "public interest" is that
it may not consider whether a third party would be more qualified than
the intended transferee."8 As recent cases indicate, the range of con-
siderations beyond this limitation established under the "public interest"
test prior to the 1952 amendments is preserved. 9 An understanding of
the present status of transfer law must be based on an evaluation of
various factors considered under this test.
The sale price of the station was at one time a salient consideration
in transfers."0 Although legislation to eliminate profits made from trans-
fers has been proposed, there has never been a direct enactment imposing
such restrictions.2 Congress has specifically provided that a license is
for the use of the airwaves alone; a license does not confer ownership.
22
Consequently, to prevent the licensee from obtaining a profit from the
sale of his license, the FCC required a reasonable relationship between
the value of station assets and price. 2   The parties were often allowed
18. 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b)(1952). The statute provides that the, ". . . Commission may not consider
whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the transfer,
assignment, or disposal of the permit or license to a person other than the proposed
transferee or assignee."
19. See D.R. James, Jr., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 917, 920 (1953) (by implication);
Versluis Radio and Television, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 1123 (1953) (by implication).
20. EDLEMAN, THE LIcENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927 TO
1947 95-97 (1950) ; Warner, Transfers of Broadcasting Licenses Under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 21 B.U.L. REv. 585 (1941); Salsbury, The Transfer of Broadcast
Rights, 11 AIR L. REv. 113, 125-138 (1940) ; Stewart, The Public Control of Radio, 8 AIm
L. REv. 131, 141-144 (1937).
21. ,One proposed amendment suggested that the Commission should not approve
transfers or assignments if the consideration were greater than the reasonable value of the
apparatus and studio equipment. H.R. REP. No. 9971, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1162 (1926).
22. 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 711, 47 U.S.C. §
151 (1952). There was a similar provision in the Radio Act of 1927. 44 STAT. 1162
(1927). The policy of the act has always been clear that no person is to have a property
right in his license. For early analysis of the property concept in radio see Zollmann,
Recent Federal Legislation Radio Act of 1927, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 121 (1927); Taugher,
The Law of Radio Communication with Particular Reference to a Property Right in a
Radio Wave Length, 12 MARg. L. REv. 179 (1928) ; Note, 39 YALE L.J. 245, 250 (1929).
23. In one case the Commission stated: "Conceivably the purchase price paid for a
broadcast station may be so high that the conclusion is inescapable that a valuation has
been placed on the station's operating assignment . . . We do not believe that such is the
case here." WNAX Broadcasting Co., 6 FCC 397, 406 (1938). The implication is that
a valuation of the license would have been disapproved.
A series of decisions approved transfers where the relationship between the price for
the station and its value was reasonable. See KID Broadcasting Co., 11 FCC 99, 100-101
(1945) (sale price $108,000; replacement value $75,000) ; Albert Steinfeld & Co., 6 FCC
714, 715-716 (1939) (price $35,000; replacement value $29,640.54); Blye, 6 FCC 383,
384 (1938) (price $27,000; replacement value $24,937.06) ; Pacific Radio Corp., 5 FCC
427, 427-428 (1938) (price $14,000; replacement value $13,000) ; Smith and Mace, 5 FCC
342, 343-344 (1938) ; (price $17,000; replacement value $11,262.57) ; Gillette Rubber Co.,
2 FCC 127, 129 (1935) (price $30,000; estimated replacement value $32,121.25). See
NOTES
to justify discrepancies between price and cost, however, by including as
assets the capitalized earning power24 and expenses2" and a wide range of
intangible assets.2" An unreasonable relationship between price and value
was never held sufficient ground alone for disapproving a transfer. 7
Frequently, the price factor was entirely ignored.2" In the Selin Seitz
decision in 1938, the FCC expressly stated that price was no longer a
primary consideration, and in subsequent cases completely avoided the
price element."0 In 1945 the Commission admitted to Congress its in-
ability adequately to consider price, except in limited circumstances, and
Segal and Warner, "Otership" of Broadcasting "Frequencies": A Re'view, 19 Rocny
MT. L. REv. 115, 122 (1947) ; Note, 10 AIR L. REv. 189 (1939).
The Commission has also been influenced by the "bare-bones" policy in public utility
law which is designed to prevent any valuation of a license, limiting the price to the
value of the physical equipment. See Travelers Broadcasting Service Corp., 6 FCC 456
(1938). However, this doctrine has played a negligible role in the regulation of price in
radio license transfers. See Warner, Transfers of Broadcasting Licenses Under the
Communications Act of 1934, 21 B.U.L. REv. 585, 613-616 (1941); see Western Broadcast
Co., 3 FCC 179, 186 (1936).
24. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 4 FCC 627, 631 (1937); Western Broadcasting
Co., 3 FCC 179, 186 (1936).
25. E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co., 6 FCC 605, 606 (1938); Sapp and Sapp, 6 FCC
521, 522 (1938) ; Bishop and Roosevelt, 5 FCC 301, 302 (1938); KXL Broadcasters, 4
FCC 186, 191 (1937); Oklahoma Broadcasting Co., 3 FCC 464, 465 (1936). But cf.,
Travelers Broadcasting Service Corp., 6 FCC 456, 463 (1938).
26. Various factors have been included within the scope of intangible assets. See,
for example, Reynolds, 4 FCC 382, 384 (1937) (advertising contracts) ; Western Broad-
cast Co., 3 FCC 179, 187 (1936) (prosperous sales area); Beverly Hills Broadcasting
Corp., 4 FCC 250, 252 (1937) (offers of competing purchasers); WGAR Broadcasting
Co., 5 FCC 540, 544 (1937) (network franchises); Western Broadcast Co., 3 FCC 179,
188 (1936) (established audience); Exchange Avenue,Baptist Church, 5 FCC 333, 337
(1938) (good will of church, the transferor).
27. In those cases denying transfers where there was a vast discrepancy in value
and price paid, the Commission stressed other reasons for prohibiting the tranfer. See
Liberty Life Insurance Co., 9 FCC 104, 106 (1942); Travelers Broadcasting Service
Corp., 6 FCC 456, 461-463 (1938) ; Jackson, 5 FCC 496, 500 (1938).
28. See Edward H. Butler, 9 FCC 141 (1942); KVOS, Inc., 6 FCC 22 (1938);
Red Oak Radio Corp., 1 FCC 163 (1934). The Commission would frequently list the
price and compare it with the value of the station without attempting to justify dis-
crepancies. E.g., Nolan S. Walker and Edward P. Graham, 5 FCC 234, 236 (1938)
(100% mark up on net worth); Bishop and Roosevelt, 5 FCC 301, 302 (1938) (sale
price $57,500; net worth $33,981.80) ; Beverly Hills Broadcasting Corp., 4 FCC 250,
252-253 (1937) (price $125,000; book value of assets $40,839.96). For an expression of
alarm over the unreasonable prices in station transfer, see Stewart, The Public Control
of Radio, 8 Amt L. Rnv. 131, 141-144 (1937).
29. 7 FCC 315 (1938). In this case there was a great difference between price and
value, but the Commission stated ". . . our primary consideration, from the standpoint
of the public interest, deals not with the prevailing relationship between contract price
and the items to be transferred, but rather with the qualifications of the proposed trans-
ferees and their ability to provide the public with an improved broadcast service." Id. at
318.
30. See Radio Corp. of America, 10 FCC 212 (1943) ; Edward H. Butler, 9 FCC
141 (1942) ; George F. Courrier, 9 FCC 139 (1942) ; John P. Scripps, 9 FCC 206 (1942) ;
Federated Publications, Inc., 9 FCC 150 (1942); Lee E. Mudgett, 8 FCC 227 (1940);
Anchorage Radio Club, Inc., 7 FCC 306 (1939).
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requested Congressional direction."' Guiding legislation did not ensue
and the commission continued to exclude price as an element in transfers."s
Recently a four million dollar sale was consummated without considera-
tion of the price.3 Commissioner Lee in a concurring opinion did point
out that a seventy-five percent profit was made in the sale but concluded
that he did not, ". . . complain at the fact that the licensee is making a
very substantial profit."3 4
Permitting unlimited prices for stations is inimical to public interest
even though the public has no direct financial interest in radio.3" The
public does have an interest in receiving efficient radio and television
service, and in order to further this interest, Congress preserved competi-
tion in the field of broadcasting. 6 The freedom of an entrepreneur to
develop his business and sell it for a profit is fundamental to an effective
competitive system. One writer points out that if the FCC had restricted
all profits from the sale of stations because the government owned the
license under which it operated, new investment would not be attracted.3
There would be less expansion and lack of interest in the industry."
While there are advantages derived from competition, it must be remem-
bered that, in the broadcasting field, frequencies are limited and licenses
are a prerequisite to operation. Exorbitant prices are demanded for sta-
31. The FCC sent letters to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee and the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee requesting Congressional direction
as to the policy the FCC should follow in passing on the sale of radio stations. 11 Ann.
Rep. of FCC 12-13 (1945).
The Commission in one case during the year attempted to clarify its policy on the
relation of price to transfers. In essence, price was to be considered in only three situa-
tions: when the price paid indicated trafficking, adversely affected the licensee's fi-
nancial qualifications or resulted in over-commercialization. See Powel Crosley, Jr., 11
FCC 3, 23 (1945).
32. In 1946, the FCC approved a transfer involving "good will" as an asset worth
over $2,000,000. It expressed its inability to cope with price differences without con-
gressional directives feeling that it did not "have the legal power to disapprove the
transaction because of the price." Edward J. Noble, 11 FCC 569, 576 (1946). Succeed-
ing decisions avoided price discussions. See Evening News Publishing Co., 9 Pike &
Fischer RR 1096 (1953) ; Sunland Broadcasting Co., 6 Pike & Fischer RR 1053 (1950);
KPMO, 6 Pike & Fischer RR 137 (1950).
33. Wrather-Alvarez, Inc., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 539 (1953).
34. Id. at 540.
35. But see ROSE, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING 119-120 (1940). The
author contends that the people actually have a financial interest in radio since they pay
directly by the purchase of sets, and electricity, and they pay indirectly by purchasing
products of sponsors. While this is true, the interest appears to be too remote to merit
serious consideration.
36. See ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF THE FCC, REPORT ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DATA PURSUANT TO THE INFORMAL HEARING ON BROADCASTING 43 (1938). For a discus-
sion of other systems of broadcasting throughout the world see CHESTER AND GARRISON,
RADIO AND TELEVISION 137-153 (1950).
37. Rose, op. cit. supra note 35, at 112-113.
38. Ibid.
NOTES
tions, a substantial premium being paid for the license itself.3 9 Such a
payment is not a compensation for developing a successful station, but
a reward for merely-acquiring a license. It has been indicated that ex-
cessive prices for stations intensifies the pressure to make a profit, pos-
sibly resulting in "over-commercialization." 4  Program quality may be
sacrificed for less expensive methods of operation.4 Potential trans-
ferees are the highest bidders,"2 and there is no necessary relationship be-
tween the person willing to make the largest investment and the most
competent operator.
A further outgrowth of the excessive price is possible stimulation
of trafficking in licenses.43 The procurement of licenses for the purpose
of selling them for a profit is usually referred to as trafficking.44 While
attempts to regulate this practice by direct legislation failed, the FCC
did establish prohibitions by refusing to grant licensesor approve transfers
when the evidence disclosed an intent to assign the license rather than
use it. 5 During recent congressional hearings, a radio executive revealed
that trafficking was "going on to a degree . . . worthy of attention. 46
A recent decision in which a license was awarded to a party just two years
after he had sold one for a $100,000 profit indicates the current FCC
attitude toward this practice.4 ' The competitor for the license was fore-
39. Justin Miller, President of the National Association of Radio and Television
Broadcasters, in reply to a question asking what represents the difference between the
purchase price and the tangible property, said: "A great deal of that value is incident to
the fact that he has rights under a license to use a particular frequency. We need not
make any bones about that." Hearintgs before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S.658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 360 (1951). A publication reported the follow-
ing: "Twenty-five of the 40 major sales since 1949 have been for prices of more than
a million dollars. Many stations brought 2 million to 3 million." U. S. News and
World Report, Aug. 27, 1954, p. 40. BROADCASTING-TELECASTING YEARBOOK (1953-1954)
lists the major sales for 1953, eighteen of which were for over a million dollars. Larger
sales included: WABT-2.5 million; KHJ-TV-2.5 million; KNXT-3.6 million;
KFMB-TV-3 million; KOTV-2.5 million; WOR-TV, AM, FM-4.5 million plus
lease. Id. at 300-301.
40. SIEPMAN, RADIO'S SECOND CHANCE 165-166 (1946).
41. Rose, op. cit. supra note 35, at 112.
42. Siepman, op. cit. supra note 40, at 166. See Powel Crosley, 11 FCC 3, 12-13
(1945).
43. Siepman, op. cit. supra note 40, at 165.
44. Warner, Transfers of Broadcasting Licenses Under the Communications Act of
5934, 21 B.U.L. REv. 585, 595 (1941).
45. Hearst Radio, Inc., 7 FCC 292, 295 (1939) ; City of Sebring, Fla., 11 FCC 873,
890 (1947). In KFNF, Inc., 11 FCC 78, 88-89 (1945) the Commission announced its
disapproval of purchasing a station merely to eliminate it from the broadcast field with-
out using it and thus giving a more suitable frequency to another station.
46. Statement of Harry Bannister, General Manager of Stations WWJ, WWJ-FM,
WWJ-TV in Detroit, Michigan, at Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.I333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1947).
47. Versluis Radio and Television, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 1123 (1953). A com-
peting applicant for the television station in question offered to prove that a $100,000
profit had been made by his competitor on the sale of a former license. This proof was
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closed from raising the issue of trafficking, the Commission stating that
re-entry into broadcasting within two years indicated only "... a pos-
sible attachment to that area."4
Trafficking raises a erious threat of inferior and mediocre stand-
ards of broadcasting to the detriment of the public interest. Applicant
R may compete for a license with the intent to transfer it to S if he wins."
In a close decision, he defeats applicant T and transfers immediately to S
who may have only minimum qualifications, perhaps much less than T.
The public never gets the benefits of R's or T's superior qualifications.
There is a grave inconsistency in providing elaborate procedures for li-
censing to determine the best qualified applicant only to have the basis
for the decision shattered by a transfer.5 The seriousness of the problem
was recognized by the FCC in 1945 in its adoption of the AVCO rule.5
This rule in essence required transferors to advertise their proposed
transfers in order to enable interested parties to compete for the station.52
This rule was abandoned by the Commission in 1949,"3 and the possibility
now of comparable regulation seems precluded by the 1952 amendments. 4
disallowed.
48. Verslius Radio and Television, Inc., supra note 47, at 1141.
49. The successful licensee may operate the station and then sell it later. How-
ever, the effect on the public is about the same as if he sold it immediately.
50. Commissioner Lee recently stated: ". . . I am concerned because the transfer
processing does not answer for me the question as to how the prospective purchaser
would have fared in a comparative hearing. . ." Concurring opinion in Wrather-Alvarez,
Inc., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 539, 540 (1954). Similar expressions are found in Com-
missioner Lee's dissenting opinion in Aladdin Radio and Television, Inc., 10 Pike &
Fischer RR 773, 776 (1954).
51. The AVCO rule, requiring a competitive transfer system, was an outgrowth of
the Powel Crosley decision, 11 FCC 3 (1945), approving a transfer of the Crosley assets,
which included a radio station. The large sum of money involved in the transaction and
the apparent lack of interest of the transferees in the station highlighted the inadequacies
of the existing system of transfers. See Siepman, op. cit. supra note 40, at 165-183.
52. 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.321 (Supp. 1946). Both the FCC and the applicant
would give public notice of pertinent details of the application, including the terms of
the sale, the name of the proposed transferee, and a statement that any other party wish-
ing to apply for the facilities might do so on the same contract terms and conditions as
set forth in the contract. If there were other applications for the station, all would be
considered and a hearing held, the most competent applicant winning the license. The
primary objectives, as summarized in Associated Broadcasters, Inc., 12. FCC 688, 698
(1948), were (1) securing the best qualified persons as broadcast licensees, (2) prevent-
ing undue concentration of radio facilities, and (3) encouraging open competition among
qualified persons desiring to operate radio facilities.
For a comprehensive discussion of the AVCO procedure, see statement by Charles
R. Denny, former Chairman of the FCC, in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Com-
inttee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.I333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1947).
53. In abandoning the rule, the Commission said: "Experience under the AVCO
rule has failed to realize the expectations with respect to making possible a choice be-
tween two or more competing applications for assignments or transfer of control. More-
over, the AVCO rule in many cases produces severe hardships on parties interested in
assignments or transfers of control." 17 U.S.L. WEEK 2574 (June 14, 1949).
54. Supra, note 18.
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An earlier method used by the Commission to control transfers
hinged on the requirement of a resulting public benefit as justification
for a sale.55 Unless improved service, which encompassed an extensive
group of factors," was indicated, applications for transfer were gener-
ally denied. 7 The FCC seemed recently to depart from this established
policy.5" Abandonment of this practice gives even more freedom to
transfers and may deprive the public of additional improvements it
formerly might have received from such transactions.
Except for requiring minimum qualifications in transferees, there
are currently few substantial restrictions on transfers. Limitations de-
veloped by the Commission under the "public interest" criterion have lost
their effectiveness. This permits a possible lowering of the competitive
level and may result in mediocrity in the industry. 5 The increased im-
55. See Parmer, 2 FCC 172, 175 (1935). The importance of this factor of result-
ing public benefit was emphasized by the Commission in Selma Seitz, 7 FCC 315, 318
(1939), "[O1ur primary consideration from the standpoint of the public interest, deals
. ..with the qualifications of the proposed transferees and their ability to provide the
public with an improved broadcast service."
While this was the expressed policy of the Commission, one commentator maintained
that an analysis of all decisions, including those not dignified by a written opinion, indi-
cated that an affrmative showing of some benefit was not always essential, particularly
where no detriment to the public interest was apparent. Salsbury, The Transfer 'of
Broadcast Rights, 11 Am L. Ray. 113, 142 (1940).
56. Edward H. Butler, 9 FCC 141, 142 (1942) (elimination of multiple ownership);
R. W. Hoffman, 6 FCC 498, 500 (1938) (improved coverage); Memphis Commercial
Appeal Co., 6 FCC 419, 421 (1938) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co., 6 FCC 605, 612 (1938)
(greater use of local talent) ; Exchange Avenue Baptist Church, 6 FCC 333, 337 (1938)
(improved technical equipment); Reynolds, Hughes, and Allen, 4 FCC 382, 384 (1937)
(sounder financial basis).
57. See WGAR, 4 FCC 540, 548 (1937); Travelers Broadcasting Service Corp.,
6 FCC 456, 462 (1938). In the early years of its existence, the Commission tended to
overlook a requirement of public benefit. See Lancaster Broadcasting Service, Inc., 2
FCC 164 (1935); Red Oak Radio Corp., 1 FCC 163 (1934).
58. See Walton Broadcasting Co., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 10 (1953). In this case
the only justification for approval of a transfer was that the transferees wished to
invest in the broadcast field in their former home state. Commissioner Bartley, dis-
senting, stated, ". . . if the reasons for the transfer are limited to those stated by the
transferees . . .then I would consider a grant of the application to be a departure from
our long established policy concerning protection of the public interest." But see Aladdin
Radio and Television, 10 Pike & Fischer RR 773, 775 (1953) in which language indicates
some consideration of the public benefit.
59. It might be contended that competition in the industry compensates for lower
standards, making the inferior and less competent obtain higher levels. In Gulf Coast
Broadcasting Co., 4 FCC 103, 106 (1937), it was argued that competition between local
stations results in improvements in the program service of each and promotes the public
interest. But see speech by Wayne Coy in 96 CONG. Rac. 3480 (1950) ; Hettinger, The
Economic Factor in Radio Regulation, 9 Am L. Rav. 116, 121 (1938).
Competition between superior and less competent broadcasters may tend to raise the
standard of the inferior. But the rapidity and quantity of transfers today appear to be
too great for the industry to absorb and elevate their standards. If this is the condition,
then competition exists among the less competents and the level they reach falls short of
that established by superior broadcasters. The level upon which competition exists is
more important than competition itself.
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portance of transfers only intensifies these possibilities and works against
the achievement of the Commission's purpose of securing the best possible
service for the public.
The procedural law of transfers, liberalized by the 1952 amend-
ments, is more in accord with this aim.6" The procedure for approving
and denying transfers is outlined in Section 309 of the Federal Com-
munications Act.61 In two respects, this Section merely codifies former
law." The FCC may hold a hearing before making a decision,63 retain-
ing a discretionary power to restrict an intervenor's participation" or to
grant a rehearing.65 The FCC also has the right to make a decision with-
out a hearing.66 The significant change is the addition of a protest pro-
vision applicable when the Commission makes a decision without first
holding a hearing." In such cases any "party in interest" can demand
60. For a cogent discussion of the new process for obtaining a license see Smith,
Practice and Procedure Before the Federal Communications Commission as Viewed by a
Hearing Examiner, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 276 (1954). The section dealing with procedure for
licensing is also applicable to transferees.
61. 48 STAT. 1085, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. §
309 (1952). The application of § 309 to transfers is derived from language of § 310(b),
48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 716, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)
(1952) which states in part: "Any such application shall be disposed of as if the pro-
posed transferee or assignee were making application under section 308 for the permit or
license in question." Sections 308 and 309 are applied together.
62. For a general discussion of former procedure before the FCC, see Gary, Prac-
tice and Procedure before the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Am L. REv. 112
(1937).
63. 48 STAT. 1085, 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(b) (1952) provides: "If the Commission shall be unable to make the finding
specified in subsection (a), it shall formally designate the application for hearing on
the grounds or reasons then obtaining . . ." For a comparable provision in previous
act, see 48 STAT. 1086, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1934) ; 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.387 (1953).
64. Niagara Frontier Amusement Corp., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 39 (1954).
65. 48 STAT. 1095, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 720, 47 U.S.C. § 405
(1952). The previous law was to the same effect. For a discussion of the provisions
of the earlier law see Caldwell, Federal Communicatio~s Commission-Comments on the
Report of the Staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Law, 8 GEo.
WAsn. L. REv. 749, 765 (1940).
66. 48 STAT. 1085, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(a) (1952) provides in part: "If upon examination of an application provided for
in section 308 the Commission shall find that public interest, convenience, and necessity
would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant such application." For a com-
parable provision in former law see 48 STAT. 1085, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1934). See also
Plotkin, Procedure Followed by the Federal Communications Commission in Passing up-
onApplications for Radio Stations, 17 PA. B.A.Q. 291 (1946).
67. This provision was probably the most controversial provision in the 1952 amend-
ments. The FCC had long opposed its enactment. James Fly, Chairman of the FCC at
the time, stated that this rule would subject newcomers in the radio broadcasting fields
to harassment and delay. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 781-783 (1942). Commissioner Wakefield ex-
pressed comparable fears. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S.814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 648 (1942). See also the comments of former
Chairman, Charles Denny. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on S.1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1947).
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a hearing"8 irrespective of FCC discretionary approval,6 9 a prerequisite
under former rules.7" The possible impact of this change is clear when it
is considered that nineteen out of every twenty decisions in 1950 were
made without a hearing.7 To avail himself of this section, the petitioner
must not only be a "party in interest" but must also phrase the issues and
facts of his petition with "particularity." 2 The present trend of deci-
sions points to a liberal construction of the requirement of "particular-
ity."" This approach reduces the possibility of excluding legitimate com-
plainants on a technical point. While the phrase "party in interest" is new
Support for the protest provision came from the Federal Communications Bar As-
sociation speaking through Herbert M. Bingham, a member of the association. He
criticized the Commission's policy as according existing stations little protection. Hear-
ings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S.814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 484-485
(1943).
68. The exact meaning of "hearing" as recently construed by the FCC is not clear.
Section 309(c) provides that if the jurisdictional requirements can be satisfied, the peti-
tion shall be set for a "hearing," which is to be "tried in the same manner provided in
subsection (b)" which guarantees a "full hearing." The Commission has construed
"hearing" under § 309(c) to mean only an oral hearing when questions of law and policy
alone are involved. T. E. Allen & Sons, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 594a (1953) ; see
also Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 500 (1954); Salinas Broad-
casting Corp., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 595 (1953). For a criticism of this interpretation,
see Scharfeld, j952 Report of the Committee on Communications of the Administrative
Law Section, American Bar Association, 13 FED. CoMm. B.J. 76 (1953). In support of
the Commission's policy see DAvis, ADmiNISTRATV LAw § 68 (1951).
69. H.. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952) in discussing § 309(c) states:
"Any such protest must contain allegations of fact to show that the protestant is a party
in interest and must specify the facts, matters, and things relied upon. The Commis-
sion . . . must enter a finding as to whether the protest meets the foregoing require-
ments and, if it so finds, the application involved munst be set for hearing upon the issues
set forth in the protest . . ." (emphasis added)
70. 48 STAT. 1095, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1934) was construed to authorize but not require
protest hearings where decisions were made without hearings. See York Broadcasting
Co., 6 Pike & Fischer RR 755, 757 (1950) ; Hearings before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H-R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1942).
71. Frank Roberson, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Federal Com-,
munications Bar Association, pointed out that, between March, 1950, and March, 1951,
only 261 of 4,180 applications filed in broadcast matters were designated for hearing.
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.658, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 248 (1951).
72. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952) states in part: "Any such
protest must contain allegations of fact to show that the protestant is a party in interest
and must specify the facts, matters and things relied upon." 48 STAT. 1085, 47 U.S.C. §
309(a) (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (1952). See Scharfeld, supra
note 68, at 73-76; Scharfeld, x954 Report of the Committee on Communications of the
Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association, 13 FED. Comm. B.J. 172-178
(1954).
73. Ohio Valley, 10 Pike & Fischer RR 500 (1954) indicates a departure from the
former rigorous requirements of "'particularity." But see T. E. Allen & Sons, 9 Pike &
Fischer RR 591 (1953). For a comparison of several issues and brief discussions justi-
fying their validity or invalidity under the "particularity" requirement, see Van Curler
Broadcasting Corp., 19 FED. REG. 5919 (1954). This decision indicates a willingness to
accept generally phrased issues as long as specific facts are given in support to indicate
a legitimate claim.
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to the Commission, the Senate Committee Report seems to limit its mean-
ing to any "person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected. . ., " This latter phrase is a familiar one to the FCC since
it has been used as a basis for appeal under the Communications Act."5
The courts in two major cases have ruled that licensees threatened
with electrical intereference or those who may suffer economic injury
as a result of an FCC ruling are entitled to a hearing and appeal as per-
sons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected."76  Economic
injury to the complaining party must be of a nature which endangers
the public interest. In this respect, the petitioner is a private attorney
general, protecting the public interest and not his own." Originally,
only those existing radio stations threatened by additional competition
from new licensees were allowed standing. After the 1952 amend-
74. "Fear has been expressed that use of 'parties in interest' might make possible
intervention into proceedings by a host of parties who have no legitimate interest but
solely with the purpose of delaying license grants which properly should be made. The
Committee does not so construe the term 'party in interest'; 'parties in interest' because
of electrical interference are fixed and defined by the Supreme Court decision in the
KOA case (319 U.S. 239) and the Commission's rules and regulations; 'parties in in-
terest' from an economic standpoint are defined by the Supreme Court decision in the
Sanders case (209 U.S. 470)." SEN. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
Each of the cases referred to arose under § 402(b) (2), 48 STAT. 1093, 47 U.S.C. §
402(1934), which gives rights of appeal to "any person aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such
application." See 21 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 368 (1953).
75. See note 74 supra. The effect of this change is to make standing to appeal and
intervention the same when no hearing is held. See DAvis, ADmiNiSTRATIVE LAW § 203(1951) for a discussion of the differences between appeal and intervention. See also
Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 702 (2d. Cir. 1943).
76. FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 239 (1942). FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U.S. 470(1940). See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 205 (1951); Notes, 42 MicH. L. REv. 329-
330 (1943) ; 52 YALE LJ. 671 (1943).
The Sanders case was the initial case to determine that the term "aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected" comprehends one who may be economically injured in
the issuance of a license, but dicta in prior cases was in accord; e.g., WOKO, Inc., v.
FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 107 F.2d
956, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n v. FCC, 94 F.2d 244, 248(D.C. Cir. 1937). Notes, 11 AiR L. Rav. 177 (1940) ; 5 AIR L. REv. 201 (1934). Two
cases, however, held that any allegation of economic injury is vague, problematical and
conjectural. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FCC, 76 F.2d 439, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
WGN, Inc. v. Fed. Radio Comm., 68 F.2d 432, 433 (1933).
77. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, citing the Sanders Case, said: "The Communications
Act of 1934, did not create new private rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect
the public interest in communications. By § 402(b) (2) Congress gave the right of
appeal . . . But these private litigants have standing only as representatives of the
public interest." Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
78. The Sanders case involved an existing radio station appealing a decision grant-
ing a license to a new station in the same area. The scope of this doctrine remained
fairly constant. An attempt to extend the theory to include an applicant for a station as
one suffering economic injury was denied. Mansfield Journal v. FCC, 173 F.2d 646
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
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ments, a rash of attempts to expand this concept were denied79 but finally,
in the Versluis decision the FCC, recognizing the competition between
radio and television, permitted a radio station to protest the licensing of
a television station in the same area."0 This liberal construction was en-
larged in a recent case to permit a newspaper to protest the grant of a
television station.$'
The Commission was reluctant to expand the meaning of "party in
interest" in transfer proceedings. In Camden Radio, Inc., a competing
radio station sought and was denied the right to protest a transfer ap-
proved by the FCC without a hearing8 2 The Commission reasoned that
the petitioner had not shown that he would suffer any economic injury
from operation of the station by the assignee rather than by the assignor
since his competitive situation was unchanged.83 The District Court re-
versed the Commission pointing out that no showing of a change in the
79. These cases held that petitioner (s) did not qualify as "parties in interest": Capi-
tal Broadcasting Co., 8 Pike & Fischer RR 229 (1952) (members of the public who ride
transit lines which were equipped with radios) ; Kansas State College of Agriculture and
Applied Science, 8 Pike & Fischer RR 261 (1952) (association of radio and television
broadcasters) ; Poland Industries, 8 Pike & Fischer RR 398 (1952) (applicant for a con-
struction permit where the same channel was given to another before the petitioner ap-
plied); Paul A. Brandt, 8 Pike & Fischer RR 402 (1952) (an individual with no interest
other than as a member of the public) ; NBC, Inc., 8 Pike & Fischer RR 647 (1952)
(individual with personal grievance against a station).
80. Versluis Radio and Television, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 102 (1953), reversing,
9 Pike & Fischer RR 104 (1953). The FCC had originally refused to extend the Sanders
doctrine to include an AM station in competition with a television station. Commissioner
Hennock's dissent in the first decision pointed out: "Since television stations clearly
compete with radio stations for both audience and advertisers, an existing radio station
has exactly the same sort of economic interest which the Supreme Court found controlling
in the Sanders case." Id. at 107-108.
In reconsidering its first decision, the FCC apparently accepted the reasoning of
Commissioner Hennock. With this change of policy, the FCC enlarged the classifica-
tion of those qualifying as "parties in interest"; see WHEC, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR
172 (1953) (licensee of a standard broadcast station asserting economic injury from
television grant) ; Salinas Broadcasting Corp., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 192 (1953) (per-
mittee of a television station asserting economic injury from new television station in the
area) ; accord, Eugene Television, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 601 (1953); Cherry &
Webb Broadcasting Co., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 1093 (1953). See 102 U. OF PA. L. REv.
1080 (1954).
81. Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 452 (1954). The Com-
mission decided in a 4-3 decision that § 309 (c) was not limited to licensees and permittees
of the Commission and that injury from direct competition was sufficient to confer
standing. Id. at 455-456. See 102 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 1080 "(1954). This decision should
be contrasted with one denying a protest to a taxicab company which argued it would
suffer economic injury from the grant of a radio license to a competing cab company.
Yellow Cab Co. of Chicago, Ill., 9 Pike & Fischer RR 122a, 123 (1953).
82. 9 Pike & Fischer RR 359 (1953).
83. Commissioner Hennock's dissent argued that the act made no such requirement
of showing additional economic injury. Id. at 360.
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competitive situation was required by the statute.8"
Underlying the court's position is a possible awareness of potential
detrimental consequences stemming from the FCC's decision. In any
transfer, there are two possible injuries to the public. One is economic
injury to the protesting station which indirectly affects the public, 5 and
the other is the detriment from a transferee's lack of qualifications. In
a transfer, harm to the public because of economic injury to the protest-
ing station although possible is unlikely since a transfer would probably
not alter competition in the area. If additional injury were required
for a protest, it would be virtually impossible to dispute transfers. The
transferee's potentially inferior qualifications could not be challenged in
a hearing permitting the presentation of all relevant facts and issues.86
The fact that the economic issue has been decided in the original grant of
the license should be no bar to the protest hearing since protection of the
public interest rather than injury to the complainant is the legal basis of
the suit.87 Since licensing and transferring are comparable in their im-
pact on the public interest, it would be unwise to extend greater protection
to the public in one type of proceeding than in the other."
84. Camden Radio, Inc. v. FCC, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1954), 10 Pike &
Fischer RR 2072 (1954).
While the act does not require this additional showing of economic injury, the Com-
mission has imposed this requirement. In Channel 16 of Rhode Island, Inc., 10 Pike &
Fischer RR 377 (1954) a permittee of a television station had no standing to protest the
Commission's decision to give an extension of time for the construction of a competing
television station.
The validity of this reasoning was upheld in other cases: Spartan Radiocasting Co.,
10 Pike & Fischer RR 287 (1954) (no economic injury caused by the grant of a special
temporary authority); Spartan Radiocasting Co., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 587 (1954)
(modification of construction permit authorizing change of transmitter site) ; Tri-State
Television, Inc., 10 Pike & Fischer RR 1049 (1954) (extension of time to complete con-
struction caused no economic injury.) But cf. Midwest Television, Inc., 9 Pike & Fischer
RR 611 (1953) (a change in the transmitter site resulted in a signal of principal city
strength being put over a city for the first time and thus new economic injury was found
and a protest allowed).
85. FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
86. Former Chairman of the FCC, Charles Denny, has said: "[I]t is extremely dif-
ficult to determine the qualifications of an applicant simply on the basis of information
contained in the application. Moreover, persons in the community may have some rele-
vant information that does not appear in the application. Only a hearing can produce
this additional information." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce on S.5333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1947).
87. FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940).
88. The principal factor against broadening the scope of protest proceedings is the
impairment of agency efficiency because of delays and undue complication of issues by
persons whose sole purpose is to postpone the date at which any television or radio
service may be made available to their market areas. DAvIs, ADMINIsmTATivE LAW § 203
(1951). See also comments by Commissioner Doerfer in Hearings before the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Workload of the FCC, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1953).
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Regardless of procedural rights to demand hearings, 9 if the FCC
is passive in deciding basic issues of trafficking, price, and public benefit,
the threat of mediocrity in the industry persists. The primary, obliga-
tion for imposing restrictions on transfers lies with Congress. Perhaps
Congress should reconsider its adopted policy against enabling interested
parties to compete for any license to be transferred. Allowing competi-
tive transfers would parallel the system used in licensing and would tend
to secure the most qualified applicants.9" Further, since the transferor
under this system can still make his own contract terms and limit trans-
ferees to the highest bidders, it might be wise to impose a limitation on
the sale price.9' The owner could be allowed a profit based on his success-
ful operation of the broadcasting business, which has enhanced the sta-
tion's value, but excessive prices indicating compensation for the license
itself could be disallowed.92
Even without legislative guidance and standards, the FCC could
considerably strengthen its regulation of transfers. In the face of the
1952 amendments it is clear that the Commission could not renew the
AVCO rule.93 However, a showing of some public benefit to be derived
from each transfer could be required thus tending to sustain present
standards in the industry. The Commission might impose its own dis-
cretionary limitation on excessive sale prices for licenses without doing
violence to legislative authority.94 In addition, the Commission should be
more willing to consider evidence of trafficking. New legislative guides
or revitalized FCC policies could do much to improve the present status
of transfer law. More rigid regulation seems necessary in order to secure
for the public maximum benefits from broadcasting.
89. An attempt to remove this liberal protest provision is contained in S.2853, cur-
rently before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which provides in
part: "The Commission shall within 30 days of the filing of the protest render a deci-
sion which decision shall either affirm the grant or designate the application for hear-
ing . . ." S.2853, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
90. It is conceded that this changed procedure would necessitate more personnel and
would require increased appropriations for the FCC.
91. One writer indicates the dangers of this: "But certainly any process which
would give to the Commission the power to determine the propriety of a given price for
a particular broadcasting station would . . . plunge the Commission into all the com-
plicated problems of 'fair value.' . . ." Rose, op. cit. supra note 35, at 114.
92. For arguments against such disallowance, see Note, 9 Am L. Rzv. 77, 78 (1938).
93. SEN. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951) states that one purpose of the
new section is to annul the AVCO procedure because such a procedure was an invasion
by a government agency into private business practice.
94. The process of determining what constitutes a reasonable price is very com-
plicated. This involves all the problems of valuation of assets and it may well be that
the FCC could notcompetently deal with this complex problem.
